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COMMON LIFE AND
ANIMALITY IN
HUME
Peter S. Fosl

is curious to note the appearance of animality in
Hume's philosophical works, especially the Treatise of
Human Nature} Part III of Treatise I, that profoundly
important portion of the Treatise in which Hume develops his
theories of belief, knowledge, probability, and causation is brought to
a close with an entire section devoted to "the reason of animals."
' David Hume (1711-76), A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to Introduce the
Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects, L. A. Selby-Bigge Sc P. H. Nidditch,
eds., second edition (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1978). First published 1739-40. Hereafter,
"T." Notice of Hume's concerns with animals is by no means a recent phenomenon. Hume's
views were, for example, thought important enough to be roundly criticized by John
Lawrence in his popular A Philosophical and Practical Treatise on Horses arul on the Moral
Duties of Man towards the Brute Creation (London: T. N. Longman, 1796-98). (Thanks to
Timothy Morton for this reference.) Charles Darwin was also a reader of Hume and may
have drawn some of his own thoughts on rationality and knowledge as well as on human,
animal, and physical nature from Hume's texts; see William B. Huntley, "David Hume and
Charles Darwin," Journal of the History of Ideas 33 (1972); 457-70. T. H. Huxley, a influential
biologist and contemporary supporter of Darwin, pursued sustained readings of Hume. In
his Hume (London, 1878), Huxley writes that it was "a remarkable example of Hume's
sagacity that he perceived the importance of a branch of science which even now, can hardly
he said to exist...comparative psychology" (104; Huntley 466).
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Similarly, Part II of Treatise II, the portion of Good David's book
devoted to the passions, is capped with a section on "the love and
hatred of animals." Animality surfaces briefly at a number of other
places in the Treatise, perhaps most significantly and most famously
during an assessment of virtue in Book III (Pt. I, § 1), where Hume
compares the moral status of incestuous relationships among animals
to those of humans. Turning to Hume's Enquiries, one finds that the
ninth of the twelve sections composing the Enquiry Concerning
Human Understanding is reserved for a discussion of the "Reason of
Animals," while Hume addresses animals in the Enquiry Concerning
the Principles of Morals not as a means of explicating virtue per se but,
rather, benevolence (Appendix II, 252) and the specific artificial virtue
of justice (§ III, 152).^
The presence of concerns with animality in the work of a thinker
such as Hume, even in such a remarkable quantity, may not seem
terribly surprising. After all, we are told by the most formidable
recent commentators on Hume's work that Hume is a "naturalist."'
By deploying animality in a naturalistic spirit, Hume means to signal,
among other things, his alliance with those thinkers constructing a
new science of the natural world. By construing human being as
continuous with the natural order, Hume embraces a conceptual
framework that makes it possible for conclusions about humanity to
be legitimately illustrated and supported by observations of animal
life. Alongside other naturalists' anatomical researches into the body,
then, Hume intends to position his work as an "anatomy of the
mind" (7 326; EHU 82 [104], 7176-7, 7325)."
^ David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of
Morals, L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch, eds., third edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1975), 300, 190-1. Hereafter, "EHLT and "EPM," respectively. The former was first published
in 1748, the latter in 1751. References to the 1975 pagination oi EHU and EPM will appear
in squared brackets; unbracketed references to these texts are to the 1777 edition. References
to other portions of the Selby-Bigge text will be designated, "Enquiries."
' Richard Popkin, "David Hume: His Pyrrhonism and his Critique of Pyrrhonism," The
Philosophical Quarterly 1.5 (1951): 385-407. Norman Kemp Smith, "The Naturalism of
Hume (I)," Mind: A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy [NS] 14.54 (April 1905):
149-73; "The Naturalism of Hume (II)," AfjW [NS] 14.55 (July 1905): 335-47; The Philosophy
of David Hume: A Critical Study of its Origins and Central Doctrines (London: Macmillan,
1941).
* It is important to qualify this claim, however, by pointing out that Hume distinguishes his
project from those of both "anatomy and natural philosophy" proper (T 8, 275-6).
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Moreover, Hume's embrace of the principle of parsimony in
science, a principle of great importance to early modern natural
science, renders his maintenance of the fundamental continuity of
humans with other animals consistent with his "attempt to introduce
the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects."^ Other
things being equal, an explanatory system whose principles extend
over a wider set of cases than another is to be preferred, and a system
which explains the nature of both humans and animals (rather than
only humans or only animals) accomplishes this.^
Interpreters have also read the presence of animality in Hume's
texts as part and parcel of a skeptical Enlightenment figure's assault
upon precedent, hierarchical and religious thought/ By affirming the
continuity between humans and other animals and by appealing to
the behavior of animals as evidence for the accuracy of his
philosophical system, Hume's texts comfortably sustain a reading of
his work which construes his concerns with animality along
instrumental, even mercenary, lines. The role of animality, according
to this view, then, is a subversive one, undermining the privilege and
authority of humans, purportedly essential human attributes such as
rationality, and indeed the status of human things generally.
Montaigne deploys animality to such effect in his enormously popular
Apologie de Raimond Sebond (1580), arguing that animals are often not
only more clever and hardier than humans; they are also often more
virtuous as well. Some, for example elephants, he maintains, are even
® Michael J. Seidler, "Hume and the Animals," TTje Southern Journal of Philosophy 15 (1977):
361-72. F. A. Muckler, "On the Reason of Animals: Historical Antecedents of the Logic of
Modern Behaviorism," Psychological Reports 12 (1963): 868.
' Hume writes: "'tis the sign of an unskillful naturalist to have recourse to a different quality,
in order to explain every different operation....To invent without a scruple a new principle
to every new phaenomenon, instead of adapting it to the old; to overload our hypotheses
with a variety of this kind; are certain proofs, that none of these principles is a just one, and
that we only desire, by a number of falsehoods to cover our ignorance of the truth" (7" 282;
Seidler 265).
' David Werther, "Animal Reason and the Imago Dei," Religious Studies 24 (1988): 325-35.
Marvin Fox, "Religion and Human Nature in the Philosophy of David Hume," in William
L. Reese and Eugene Freeman, eds.. Process and Divinity (La Salle: Open Court, 1964),
561-77. Fox argues that Hume's remarks on animals in the Treatise produce a more powerful
attack upon religion than that embodied in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. See
also Seidler, 362-4.
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religious.® Indeed, many figures in the skeptical tradition, ancient and
modern, have made use of animals in pursuing their critical ventures.'
Anesidemus's tropes, for example, as they were recorded by Sextus
Empiricus, rely heavily upon comparisons between humans and other
animals in advancing their destructive work.'°
In Hume, skepticism pursues this critical and leveling project;
however, it also pursues something more. Hume's use of animality
also serves the skeptical project of returning humanity to and
orienting it around the center of what Hume, like the ancient
Pyrrhonists, calls "common life."" Hume, characteristically, writes:
' Michel de Montaigne (1533-92), "Apology for Raymond Sebond," in Donald M. Frame, ed.
and trans.. The Complete Works of Montaigne: Essays, Travel Journal, Letters (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1948), 343, 330-58. For an interesting commentary on such
"beasts," see Mary Midgley, "The Concept of Beastliness: Philosophy, Ethics, and Animal
Behavior," Philosophy 48 (1973): 111-35.
' Pierre Bayle (1647-1706) aigues in his Dictionnaire Historique et Critique (1695 & 97) that
a clear line cannot be drawn between Adam and animal, writing for example that "There is
nothing more diverting, than to see with what authority, the schoolmen take upon
themselves to set bounds to the knowledge of beasts." See Bayle's articles on "Rorarius,"
"Pereira," and "Sennertus." Seidler and Muckler also point to fabulist literature such as
Mandeville's Fable of the Bees as well as work by other authors which makes use of animality
in order to satirize humanity. On this subject see: A. O. Lovejoy, Reflections on Human
Nature (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1961); George Boas, The Happry Beasts in French
Thought of the 17th Century (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1933); (Muckler 874; Seidler
370n4).
Sextus Empiricus (oh. early third century). Outlines of Pyrrhonism, in R. G. Bury, trans.,
Sextus Empiricus, vol. I, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976),
Chapters XIV, XV, XVI, XVII. Hereafter, "PH." We have solid reason for thinking that
Hume read Sextus Empiricus. For example, Hume refers to Sextus in the second Enquiry,
one of the Essays, and the Natural History of Religion, quoting the Outlines (modern editions
III: xxii: 169) in the Greek at EPM Sect. IV, 166nl [207]. See also: Richard Popkin, "Sources
of Knowledge of Sextus Empiricus in Hume's Time," Journal of the History of Ideas 54.1
(1993): 137-41; "Scepticism and the ErJightenment," Studies in Voltaire and the Eighteenth
Century 24-27 (1963): 1321-45; Leo Groarke and Graham Solomon, "Some Sources for
Hume's Account of Causation," Journal of the History of Ideas 52.4 (1991): 645-63. At least
in its reference, the story of Pyrrho's pig represents perhaps the earliest skeptical use of
animals. See Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, in R. D. Hicks, trans., Diogenes
Laertius II, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), IX:68 [481].
" Sextus Empiricus writes in the Outlines of the importance for skeptics of bios ho koinos or
"common life" {PH 1:237; see also 1:23-4). Hume uses the phrase, and its cognates, on many
occasions. Consider, for example, Hume's important methodological claim in the Treatise:
"We must therefore glean up our experiments in this science from a cautious observation of
human life, and take them as they appear in the common course of the world" (T xix).
Consider as well: "philosophical decisions are nothing but the reflections of common life,
methodized and corrected" [EHU 130 [162]).
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"Happy if she [philosophy] be thence sensible of her temerity, when
she pries into these sublime mysteries; and leaving a scene so full of
obscurities and perplexities, return, with suitable modesty, to her true
and proper province, the examination of common life." {EHU 81
[103]). Not only a dimension of modern naturalism, then, and not
only an instrument of subversion, animality in Hume serves the
therapeutic function of returning humanity to itself, its loss having
resulted from what Hume calls "false" religion, false metaphysics,
politics, and superstition (e.g. T 13, 223-24). Hume's skepticism
resounds the sentiment voiced by Montaigne in his later essay "Of
experience" (1587-88) when he writes disparagingly of thinkers who
"want to get out of themselves and escape from the man" but who in
foolishly struggling to accomplish this generate instead "madness"
(856).
Montaigne continues this thought, however, writing about such
misguided thinkers that instead of "changing themselves into angels,
they change into beasts."'^ For Hume the metaphor turns in a rather
different direction. While Hume would agree in spirit with Montaigne
that false forms of thought and life frustrate human happiness and
generate "absurdities" and dangerous "enthusiasms," he departs from
his predecessor in maintaining that these monstrous distortions of the
human condition do not reduce us to the bestial; indeed, they are, for
Hume, intrinsically human vulnerabilities. Rather than rendering
continuity with animals a sign of human corruption, that continuity
is for Hume simply a prior dimension of the human fate. Rather
than resisting alignments between animals and humans as a means of
resisting virulent metaphysical speculation, Hume embraces the
"common life" shared by animals and humans in order to inoculate
human thinkers against such misguidedly "angelic" aspirations.
It is towards an articulation of the Humean vision of this common
life we share with animals that the remainder of this essay is
devoted." It is my position that this vision presents, among other
By contrast, regarding animals Montaigne writes in the Apology that "We are neither above
nor below the rest" (336).
In doing this I wish to extend the "common life" interpretation of Hume philosophical
corpus initiated by Donald W Livingston, Hume's Philosophy of Common Life (Chica^:
University of Chicago Press, 1984). See also my "Empiricism, Difference, and Common
Life," Man and World 26 (1993): 319-28; and "Doubt and Divinity: Cicero's Influence on
Hume's Religious Skepticism," Hume Studies 20.1 (1994): 103-20.

98

1650-m0

things, a powerful and versatile instrument for understanding
humanity's proper relationship to other animals. More specifically, I
wish to maintain that Hume's theory makes it possible for us to
surpass the Cartesian wholesale exclusion of animals from the moral
world while at the same time avoid the difficulties of completely
denying human privilege and granting non-human animals a moral
standing equal to that of humans.^'* My remarks, however, will not be
wholly expository and apologetic. While I believe Hume has, in its
basics, rightly and properly rendered the nature of non-human
animals as well as the moral and epistemic characteristics of our
relationships with them, it seems equally clear to me that on quite
Humean grounds the portrait Hume produces must be judged to be
intolerably limited and at times erroneous. In particular, I wish to
maintain that the terms of Hume's own philosophical system lead us
to a more expansive view of the manner in which animals may share
" Interestingly, the progress of urbanization in Britain was accompanied by increased concern
with animal rights and an emergent popular vegetarianism. Aside from Lawrence's Treatise
(nl), a number of other texts are of note: Jacobin John Oswald (ob. 1793) advances arguments
concerned with vegetarianism and animal rights in his The Cry of Nature, or an Appeal to
Mercy and to Justice on Behalf of the Persecuted Animals (London: J. Johnson, 1791). John
"Walking" Stewart (1749-1822) published a long, didactic poem, addressing non-violence
towards animals and vegetarianism: The Revelation of Nature: wherein the source of moral
motion is disclosed and a moral system established through the evidence and conviction of the
senses, to elevate man... (cl796; rpt. G. H. Evans [Granville, Middleton, NJ], 1835). Joseph
Ritson's An Essay on Abstinence from Animal Food as a Moral Duty (London: Phillips, 1802)
was much maligned but popular. Thomas Lord Erskine proposed a bill on animal rights to
the British Parliament in 1809. The physician George Cheyne had been successful earlier in
the eighteenth century in pleading for vegetarianism as a cure for "nervous" diseases. Later,
John Frank Newton published The Return to Nature; or, A Defence of the Vegetable Regimen
(London, 1811). Aphra Ben and Benjamin Franklin experimented with vegetarianism after
reading Thomas Tryon's The way to health, long life, arui happiness (London, 1683). A market
for vegetarian cook books like On Food (London: George Nicholson, 1802) took root;
subsequently Percy Bysshe Shelley would publish A Vindication of Natural Diet (1813; the
same year as Queen Mah). A curiously contrasting work, Thomas Taylor's Vindication of the
Rights of Brutes (London: Jeffrey, 1792) mocks the aspirations of Mary Wollstonecraft and the
French Revolution in musing about the absurdities to which such calls for liberty may lead:
women's rights, animal rights, vegetable and even mineral rights? (Thanks again to Timothy
Morton for alerting me to many of these texts.) See also: Timothy Morton, Shelley and the
Revolution in Taste (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Keith Thomas, Man and
the Natural World: A History of the Modem Sensibility (New York: Pantheon, 1983); and Janet
Barkas, The Vegetable Passion: A History of the Vegetarian State of Mind (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1975). Keith Tester's Animals and Society: The Humanity of Animal Rights
(New York: Routledge, 1991) shows the importance of analogies ahout the rights of animals
in then contemporary discussions of the rights of man and woman.
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in, or at least make claims upon, the moral world that humans
engage. In the subsequent sections of this paper I will examine: (I)
Hume's articulation of the capacities of animals for reason and
understanding; (II) the passionate and moral dimensions of his work;
and (III) Hume's exclusion of animals from the institutions of justice.

Human Minds and
Animal Bodies ^
The opening lines of Section XVI of Treatise I boldly announce
Hume's recognition of lines of continuity between the rational
capacities of humans and those of other animals:
Next to the ridicule of denying an evident truth, is that of
taking much pains to defend it; and no truth appears to me
more evident, than that beasts are endow'd with thought and
reason as well as men. The arguments are in this case so
obvious, that they never escape the most stupid and ignorant.
(176)
At the risk of appearing "stupid and ignorant," let us ask why it
is so clearly "evident" that animals are in fact endowed in a manner
so contrary to the way capable intellects such as those of Aristotle
and Descartes, for example, had imagined them.'^ Hume answers this
Rene Descartes (1596-1650), "Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conduaing The Reason
and Seeking for Truth in the Sciences," in Elizabeth HaJdene & G. R. T Ross, trans. & eds.,
The Philosophical Works of Descartes^ vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1931),
79-130. Hume's remark may very well be a parody of Descartes's contention in the Discourse:
"For next to the error of those who deny God...there is none which is more effectual in
leading feeble spirits from the straight path of virtue, than to imagine that the soul of the
brute is of the same nature as our own" (118). Consider as well, Descartes's famous remark:
"Hence the fact that they do better than we do, does not prove that they are endowed with
mind, for in this case they would have more reason than any of us, and would surpass us in
all other things. It rather shows that they have no reason at all, and that it is nature which
acts in them according to the disposition of their organs, just as a clock, which is only
composed of wheels and weights is able to tell the hours and measure the time more correctly
than we can do with all our wisdom" (117). In addition, consider: "By these two methods
[i.e., discerning an ability to speak and a variety of actions] we may also recognise the
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question principally through an appeal to one of the three "natural
relations" of ideas he develops in his metaphysics of the mind, namely
that of "resemblance." Hume maintains that the apparent similarity
between the actions of humans and those of other animals naturally
leads us to believe in a similarity between the causes of those
actions.'^ Hume writes that '"Tis from the resemblance of the
external actions of animals to those we ourselves perform, that we
judge their internal likewise to resemble ours; and the same principle
of reasoning, carry'd one step farther, will make us conclude that
since our internal actions resemble each other, the causes, from which
they are deriv'd must also be resembling" (T 176-7).''' This
resemblance is determined upon the basis of external, general, and
universal "signs" (T 151).'*
difference that exists between men and brutes" (116). See also Descartes's The Principles of
Philosophy, Part IV, Principles CLXXXVIII & CXC.
Note, however, that although the general position of the Aristotelian tradition has been
that among animals only humans possess a rational soul, De Anima does not itself make this
claim and leaves room for the possibility of there existing some sort of rational, non-human
animal: "all animals that possess the sense of touch have also appetition....Certain kinds of
animals possess in addition the power of locomotion, and still another order of animate
beings, i.e. man and possibly another order like man or superior to him, the power of
thinking, i.e. mind"; Aristotle (384-22 BCE), "De Anima," in Richard McKeon, ed., The Basic
Works of Aristotle, trans. J. A. Smith (New York; Random House, 1941), 560 [414bl6-20].
Thomas Aquinas would, of course, suggest angels as an example of such a creature, but there
is no necessity, for Aristotle, to leave the realm of hylo-morphic entities. Implying the
continuity of the human soul with those of other animals, Aristotle writes; "While in respect
of all the other senses we fall below many species of animals, in respect of touch we far excel
all other species in exactness of discrimination. That is why man is the most intelligent of
all animals" (421a2Q). On the other hand, Aristotle seems to exclude other animals from the
class of minded or nousing things in holding that "animals in their actions are largely guided
by them [images], some (i.e. the brutes) because of the non-existence in them of mind, others
(i.e. men) because of the temporary eclipse in them of mind by feeling or disease or sleep"
(429a5). See also Aristotle, On the Parts of Animals and On the Generation of Animals.
This propensity (let alone its normativity, exemplified in the principle of parsimony) is an
aspect of thought whose cognitive significance had been discounted by Aristotle and
Descartes. Werther disputes the very existence of this propensity on empirical grounds
(329-33). Werther, however, fails to appreciate the manner in which, for Hume, "false"
philosophy and religion may distort and disrupt the natural and common life of humans,
thereby rendering such empirical claims misleading.
Similarly, Montaigne writes in the Apology. "We must infer from like results like faculties"
(336).
" There is something misleading in this remark, insofar as it suggests that our recognition of
the other minds of other animals is an inference. Rather, this recognition is, according to
Hume, something more primitive. Whether through the relation of resemblance or, as we
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If there is a distinction in kind to be made between the reasoning
capacities of humans and other animals, Hume suggests that it might
be made along the lines of the difference between what he calls, on
the one hand, the "vulgar" and "common" inferences undertaken by
animals (such as those involved in fleeing fire and strangers but
caressing and approaching a kind familiar) and, on the other hand, the
"extraordinary" sagacity animals exhibit from time to time in
performing those remarkable though untutored feats such as selecting
the proper spot for and then building a nest (a figure which Hume
employs in both the Treatise and the Enquiry: T177, EHU 85 [108])."
The resemblance of animals' "vulgar" actions to those of our own is,
for Hume, sufficiently strong to lead us easily to the belief that their
causes must also be similar. "Extraordinarily" sagacious actions,
however, strike us as events so wonderful that we are wont to
attribute them to another, more primitive though more marvelous
source, namely the inscriptions of "instinct"—that is, the "original
hand of nature" [EHU 85 [108]). This distinction and our apparent,
correlative discontinuity with animalia, however, imply no
fundamental difference in kind when we acknowledge what Hume
maintains, namely that not only is the reasoning capacity of animals
"not in itself different, nor founded on different principles, from that
which appears in human nature" {T 177), but also that "to consider
the matter aright, reason is nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible
instinct in our souls" [T 179, EHU 85 [108]; emphasis mine). In
Aristotelian terms, for Hume there is no rational soul distinct from
the appetitive soul; while not all appetitive souls are rational—at least
not to the same extent—all rational souls are ultimately appetitive.
will see later, in our capacity for sympathy, our ability to recognize the mindedness of others
(like our ability to acknowledge the external world and causal connections) is a dimension
of the "natural" and "common life" we share with each other and with other animals.
Consider, for example, Hume's remark: "As in strings equally wound up, the motion of one
communicates itself to the rest; so all the affections readily pass from one person to another,
and beget correspondent movements in every human creature" (T 576). Again in the case of
sympathetic dynamics, the process is "an object of the plainest experience, and depends not
on any hypothesis of philosophy" (7" 319-20). My thanks to Antony E. Pitson, of the
University of Stirling, for articulating this point so well in his "Sympathy and Other Selves";
delivered at the Twenty-Second Hume Conference, Park City, Utah, July 1995.
Werther misconstrues this distinction (330), failing to register Hume's recognition of special
instincts in the extraordinarily sagacious behavior of animals where no direct correlate exists
in humans.
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Indeed, as Ronald J. Glossop points out, our ability to formulate
inductively based belief is not solely dependent on our capacities for
abstract, principled, reflective reasoning but—in being bound up with
affective, animal habit—"depends on the internal workings of a living
organism."^®
Later, Hume is more explicit in articulating the shared principles
upon which these analogous forms of reasoning are based: "the three
relations of resemblance, contiguity and causation," he writes in the
Treatise "operate in the same manner upon beasts as upon human
creatures" (2" 327). Indeed, "there is evidently the same relation of
ideas, and deriv'd from the same causes, in the minds of animals as in
those of men" (T 327). I see no reason not to attribute those relations
Hume deems "philosophical" (viz., resemblance, identity, space and
time, quantity or number, degrees of quality, contrariety, and cause
and effect) along with these "natural" relations, to animals as well.
One should not conclude, however, that Hume regards the
capacities of the animal mind to equal those of the human, either as
a matter of description or evaluation. Hume writes that "Men are
superior to beasts principally by the superiority of their reason" {T
466), and it is on account of their inferior "knowledge and under
standing" that animals "have little or no sense of virtue or vice...a are
incapable of" engaging in institutions such as those of "right and
property" (T 326).^' In these assertions Hume does share in the
Ronald J. Glossop, "In Defence of David Hume," Australian Journal of Philosophy 55.1
(May 1977): 62. For an additional discussion of this topic, as well as empirical support for
Hume*s rendering of it, see: Evan Pales and Edward A. Wasserman, "Causal Knowledge:
What Can Psychology Teach Philosophers?" The Journal of Mind and Behavior 13.1 (Winter
1992): 1-27. Barry Stroud reads Humean continuity between humans and other animals along
just these lines; see his Hume (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977), 76-77.
Among the interesting implications of this remark is its showing that reason and
understanding play a more significant role for Hume in determining one's position in moral
life than many popular readings of Hume would have it. Although he overstates his case in
maintaining that for Hume "men and animals differ in that the former have morality while
the latter do not" (95), the manner in which Hume's regard for animal reason shows his
appreciation of the depth of reason's role in moral life is developed more fully by Knut Erik
Tranoy, "Hume on Morals, Animals, and Men," The Journal of Philosophy 56 (1959): 94-103.
Tranoy writes: "Hume has recourse to reason in order to establish his moral sentiment as
a specifically moral sentiment distinct from other feelings of pain, pleasure, and sympathy.
We shall then also have found a factor which can be used to account for the moral difference
between men and animals. But the price we must pay for accepting my ailment is the
admission that Hume's ethical theory is...dependent on rational functions (100). In my own
view, this is hardly a price to be paid but merely a recognition of the complexity of Hume s
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in the arrogance of those who would establish humanity in a position
of unqualified superiority to animals. Despite such irruptions,
however, Hume's continuity thesis remains intact; for although the
differences in reasoning capacities between animals and humans are
vast, and the consequences of these differences are profound, Hume
is clear that the distinction is ultimately nothing more than an
extension of the very same differences existing among humans.^^
Indeed, in an important footnote in the Enquiries Hume goes so far
as to explain the difference between human and animal mental
capacity by means of an explanation of the differences among human
minds {EHU 84nl [107J). This expansive footnote on page eighty-four
of the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding roots the bases of
these differences in nine variables, at least seven of which involve the
reach of intrinsic mental capacities. Let us briefly examine them.
The first factor we may describe as keenness of "attention,"
"memory," and "observation." (With perhaps the exception of
memory, on this point Hume seems to be demonstrably wrong in
holding that humans are superior in this regard. Surely the powers
of attention and observation of a healthy tercel or even a common
house cat exceed those of nearly every human.)
The second factor to which Hume refers we might call, vaguely
enough, the comprehensive volume of the mind, that is its ability to
grasp systems of ideas and objects not serially, part by part, but rather
as complete, integrated wholes.
Third, Hume presents the capacity for serial thought—more
specifically, the capacity to follow out lengthy causal sequences and,
presumably, other relations of ideas. Hume suggests as much in the
Treatise when he explains that "animals have little or no sense of
thought.
Iti addition, note that although Aristotle declines to attribute rationality to animals, he
shares with Hume an inclination to exclude animals ftom an undemanding of right and
wrong, just and unjust. "And it is a characteristic of man that he alone has any sense of good
an evil, of just and unjust, and the like, and the association of living beings who have this
sense makes a family and a state"; Aristotle in Stephen Everson, ed.. Politics, trans. Benjamin
Jowett, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1984), 1253a8-18. For an assessment, however, of the mitigated quality of
Hume's exclusion, see n40fF. below.
" Although "Men are superior to beasts principally by the superiority of their reason," it
must be remembered that, according to Hume, "they are the degrees of the same faculty,
which set such an infinite difference betwixt one man and another" (T610).
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virtue or vice," for "they quickly lose sight of the relations of blood"
(r 326, emphasis mine).
Fourth, Hume cites a related power, namely the ability to think
for extended durations. (As in the case of factor one, however, Hume
may here have overestimated the capacities of humans—or
underestimated the capacities of animals.)
The fifth factor Hume describes is a talent for being able to
separate out the extrinsic circumstances among which the true cause
or causes of an event are embedded.
Sixth is the ability to form general maxims.
Seventh is the ability to draw effective analogies.
Eighth we find the retarding and disruptive factors of "prejudice,
education, passion, party, &c."
And ninth Hume places the effects of conversation, testimony, and
books.
The sixth, eighth, and ninth factors of this list are peculiar in
implying the presence of human society and conventions (such as
language) which serve to constitute it.^' Indeed, the extent to which
factors two, three, five and seven signal large differences between
animals and humans is attributable to the magnifying power of such
conventions.
Systematic wholes of greater extent may be
comprehended when they and their elements are collected under
specified concepts. Causal sequences of greater length may be
delineated when a logos of causal order has been articulated. Hume
acknowledges in this that the grounds upon which kinship and
difference between humans and animals may be identified are not
simply psychical; they are social as well.
In Hume, logos is
intrinsically bound up with nomos. Convention, if you will, is the
house of reason. The extent to which animals may be said to be
rational and, by extension, peers to humans depends, therefore, upon
the extent to which they can and do enter (or resist) the social and
conventional dimensions of rationality itself.
However, the
Note, however, that Hume does not hold that animals are incapable of language. Indeed,
we have every reason to believe that he would agree with Cleanthes who maintains in the
Dialogues that "All brute animals have a natural speech, which, however limited, is very
intelligible to their own species"; in Richard H. Popkin, ed.. Dialogues Concerning Natural
Religion and the Posthumous Essays (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1980), III: 24. The Dialogues were
first published in 1779, though begun in the early 1750s.
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composition of this list of factors reveals the nature of the beasts with
which we are dealing in Hume's philosophy in other ways as well.
Hume's theory of the collusion and elision of humanity and
animality is unsurprisingly focused upon the psychic rather than
somatic. More particularly, animality presents itself in Hume
through the nexus of issues of other minds, not so much those of
other bodies; and I call this unsurprising, for Hume's thought is, after
all, in no small way the offspring of the psycho-centric work of
Locke, Malebranche, and Berkeley.^'* However, around the psychic
focus of his theory orbit somatic considerations of a highly suggestive
nature.
Although the terms of analysis through which Hume frames his
assessment of the kinship of animals and humans are principally those
of psychic constitution, it must be understood that for Hume the
animal mind so recognized is always and only recognized through the
actions of the living, functioning animal body. The rationality of dogs
is evident, according to Hume, in their bodies' retreats from fire and
precipices and strangers (T 177); dogs' grief exhibits itself vocally in
their howling (T 396); the sympathy of lions, tigers, oxen, and horses
manifests itself in the faux fighting, biting, and scratching of their
play—that of dogs in their collecting their bodies together in packs to
hunt. Along the lines of sexual, hence corporeal behavior, animals'
passionate capacities show themselves, and (as we shall see) the body
obtrudes in an especially significant way in Hume's moral universe
when he undertakes to consider the justice of human dominion over
the corporeal existence of beasts. Hume looks to the life of the body,
rather than to the body's physical tissues, in order to ground
judgments concerned with the continuity and discontinuity of the
mind—as if our ability to recognize and acknowledge our kinship
This feature of Hume's work sets it off from the more corporeal alignments currently being
explored by contemporary philosophers of animality like the utilitarian, Peter Singer. Peter
Singer, Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for our Treatment of Animals (New York: The New
Review, 1975); The Expanding Circle: Ethics and Sociobiology (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1981). Indeed, although the advances in biological science are undoubtedly of enormous
significance to a proper understanding of humanity's relationship to other animals, we may
be well advised nevertheless to mark the observation of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-78), who
wrote in his Discourse on the Origin of Inequality (1755) that "Comparative anatomy has yet
made too little progress; the observations of naturalists are as yet too uncertain for one to be
able to establish the basis of solid reasoning on such foundations"; translated by Donald A.
Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992), 18-19.
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with animals depended upon something like our capacity (even our
reluctance or willingness) to recognize the functioning animal bodies
before us as ensouled.^'
In its et^onomic rendering, Hume's work offers us a powerful
criticism of primarily anatomical and materialistic accounts of the
relationship of humanity to the rest of the animal world. This
criticism turns upon the claim that the fundamental terms of our
atunement with and alienation from animals lies not simply in the
physiological constitution of our material bodies—the body analyzed
by, for example. Epicurean atomists and corpuscular theorists like
Gassendi and Descartes. Nor ought our alignments with animality,
according to Hume's way of thinking, rest simply upon the properties
of thought and feeling disclosed to us through theories of mind or
phenomenological inspection.^^ Unlike materialistic accounts, whose
terms of analysis must be nothing more than the similarities and
differences of anatomy, of the chemical composition of nerves, of the
architecture of the brain, musculature, and sensory apparatuses, a
Humean somatic account insists that our kinship with animals be
founded upon the resemblances of our bodies as they are ensouled
and therefore as they actively relate themselves to other ensouled
beings in a world of praxis. Conversely, unlike purely psychical
theories of human-animal comparison, a Humean account insists that
our kinship is founded upon the resemblances of our minds as they
are embodied and therefore as they actively express themselves in a
Singer's concern with the body, by contrast is with its anatomy, in particular the chemical
and architectural similarities between human and other animals' central nervous systems.
Moreover, Hume's discussion of the analogies and disanalogies between plant and animal
bodies is designed to undermine our ability to distinguish ourselves from animals along the
lines of notions of personal identity; see Susan Mendus, "Personal Identity; The Two
Analogies in Hume" The Philosophical Quarterly 30 (January 1980): 65. Charlotte Brown
argues in favor of a Humean account of animals as persons (and therefore as capable of virtue
and vice) in her, "Humean Animals" (delivered at the 18th International Hume Conference,
Eugene, Oregon, 1991); a response to this paper, "Virtues and Lovable Qualities," was
delivered at the same event by Jane Mclntyre. Brown's view is criticized by Antony E. Pitson
(n39 below).
I have in mind here something like Sartre's maintaining a kind of direct access to the other
as another like-constituted mind through the disclosive powers of the look, "I'regard." JeanPaul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology, translated by
Hazel E. Barnes (New York; Simon & Schuster, 1956). See Part Three, "Being-for-Others."
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world of other bodies7^ It is within the nexus of common life,
then—that public arena of acting, ensouled bodies—where the
boundaries of the animal and the human are for Hume acknowledged,
suppressed, defined, and elided. The avenues of relation are those of
action and convention, forms of animal life in which we recognize
ourselves and forms of human life in which we recognize the animal.
We have seen that the extent to which Hume regards animals as
unable to participate in such modes of association delineates for him
the boundary between the human and the non-human animal; and we
have seen that Hume's estimation of the capacities of non-human
animals is, on this score, rather limited.^^ The nine dimensions of
mental capacity that Hume articulates are meant to be an explanation
of this antecedent boundary. It is a necessary condition, according to
Hume that one possess certain characteristic mental capacities in order
to enter into certain artificial or conventional forms of life; and,
according to Hume, animals generally fail to meet this condition.
Might Hume, however, have been right about this in theory though
wrong in fact? Might he have heen right in identifying lived
relationships as marking the most significant lines of comparison
between humans and animals and still wrong in assessing the character
of those relationships? In order to answer these questions we must
turn to Hume's account of animals and morals. It is my contention
that Hume underestimates the extent to which animals may enter the
conventions constitutive of common moral life and that he therefore
underestimates the extent to which we may be understood to convene
or, literally, come together with them.
There are significant similarities between the Humean account of mind I am developing
here and functionalist accounts of mind. Hume, however, unlike the functionalists remains
captivated (albeit reluctantly) by the Malebranchean metaphysics in which he was immersed.
But, more importantly, the principal difference between the functionalist and Humean
approach I advance is that Hume's commitment to the authority of common life prevents
him from excluding considerations of ensouled bodies beyond those of function. In this way,
I find Hume's approach more similar to those of Wilhelm Dilthey and Maurice MerleauPonty than to that of Jerry Fodor.
" Hume's view is even more guarded than that of his predecessor Francis Hutcheson, who
permitted animals a share in morality akin to that achieved by children; An Inquiry into the
Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (London, 1725), Treatise II, Section 7, P. For an
assessment of Shaftesbury's understanding of human and animal nature see David Fate
Norton's David Hume, Common-Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1982), 38-40.
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^ Animal Passion and
Human Society ^
when we turn to Hume's moral works we are liable, as in the case
of his logical texts, to be struck by the degree of continuity he
maintains between humans and other animals. Just as humans share
with non-humans the same relations of ideas, so too, writes Hume, is
there a "union of certain affections with each other in the inferior
species of creatures as well as in the superior" {T 327). After listing
a short set of observations on animal behavior, Hume assures the
reader that the "indirect passions" (that is, passions which arise
through the conjunction of pleasure and pain with peculiar
circumstances and particular objects) of "pride and humility are not
merely human passions, but extend themselves over the whole animal
creation" {T 326). Likewise, two other important indirect passions,
love and hatred, "are common to the whole of sensitive creation" (T
397). The "direct" passions (which arise immediately from pains and
pleasures, such as desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, fear, despair, and
security) are also shared by humans with non-humans {T 448). In
addition, according to Hume, "nothing is more evident" than the fact
that animals, no less than humans, are endowed with "will" (T 448).^'
Although he makes no explicit mention of animals in this context and
although it is unlikely that animals may participate in the institution
of philosophy, it is nevertheless striking that Hume remarks that
"there cannot be two passions more nearly resembling each other,
than those of hunting and philosophy" (T 451), especially since if I
am right in my analyses thus far, the animal is capable of the
discovery and comprehension of some measure of truth and is
similarly subject to the passion of curiosity [T453).'° The practice of
philosophy may require immersion in certain institutions of language
and thought specifically different from those in which non-human
This assertion, of course, carried with it, in Hume's time and place, profoundly subversive
implications for religion.
"Truth is of two kinds, consisting either in the discovery of the proportions of ideas,
consider'd as such, or in the conformity of our ideas of objects to their real existence" (T
448). On the basis of Hume's assessment of animal capacities, it seems clear that animals are
capable of engaging in the project of truth in both senses.
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animal life finds its course. Nevertheless, it is important to note that
in Hume we find that the love of wisdom is close kin to the animal
and predatory love of the hunt.
Even more importantly, however, Hume maintains that animals
participate in the sympathetic reception and transmission of passions
among each other and across species, even between themselves and
humans. '"Tis evident," Hume writes, "that sympathy, or the
communication of passions, takes place among animals, no less than
among men" if 398). In fact, we may "observe the force of sympathy
thro' the whole animal creation" (T 363). This is a powerful claim for
Hume to make since for him sympathy is among the most important
capacities of the human mind. It plays a central role in the
determination of aesthetic judgments (T 363) as well as in our
determinations of virtue and vice (T 499, 577, 590, 601). Indeed, for
Hume, sympathy is "the chief source of our moral distinctions" (T
618).
Moreover, on the basis of sympathy—not that of some specious
prior contract—animal, like human, society is possible: "In all
creatures, that prey not upon others, and are not agitated with violent
passions, there appears a remarkable desire for company" {T 363).''
Sympathy makes possible the organic and orderly convening of the
members of a social body into something approaching a coherent
whole, a whole whose integrity depends upon the agreements
discovered and created in the formation of customs, conventions, and
general rules. Like those of humans, the minds of animals "are
mirrors to one another" (T 365), and their passions are focused,
filtered, modulated, and magnified through the lenses of convention,
those modes of social, lived action through which the mind is
structured and libidinal possibilities realized.'^ For Hume, convention
is the house not only of reason but of passion as well."
Of course, pace Hume, this desire also exists among predators and among those agitated byviolent passions.
See chapter two, "Cultural World and General Rules," and Chapter Three, "The Power of
the Imagination in Ethics and Knowledge," of Gilles Deleuze's Empiricism and Subjectivity:
An Essay on Hume^s Theory of Human Nature^ trans. Constantin V. Boundas (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1991).
Hume's theory of the self may, therefore, be understood to apply to animals as well as
humans.
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If non-human animals may justly be understood to form societies
of their own, and if such animals may be acknowledged able to enter
into sympathetic-social relationships with humans, what are the
possibilities and limits of those relationships and to what extent may
those relationships be characterized as ones of moral obligation and
duty? In other words, can animals dwell within the moral household
inhabited by humanity? For Hume the answer is yes, and the basis
of that answer is rooted in our shared capacities for sympathetic
convening with animals as well as in the possible concordances of
those conventions with the sympathetic-conventional relationships
structuring our relationships with other humans.'"' These capacities
and possibilities are themselves limited by those of the principles of
human and animal nature, capacities and possibilities concerning
which we may, as does Hume, offer general descriptions but whose
particular tolerances resist any a priori determination. While the
conventions governing human and animal society are variable, they
are limited and as such non-arbitrary.
From a Humean point of view, neither a strictly physiological
appraisal of the situation, nor an appeal to metaphysical posits—such
as, for example, intrinsic animal rights—can settle the issue of what
the proper moral life of humans with other animals ought to be. The
criteria governing the rights and wrongs of any moral relationship,
human or bestial, remain for Hume intrinsic to the particular
manners of convention governing the particular society in ques
tion—whether that society include only humans or humans and other
animals. This much Hume makes clear in the short section, "A
Dialogue," appended to the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of
Morals, when he writes that "There are no manners so innocent or
reasonable, but may be rendered odious or ridiculous, if measured by
a standard, unknown to the persons" {Enquiries 330). More
particularly, Hume maintains that "an Athenian man of merit might
Marjorie Grene observes that Hume's maintenance of the similarity of humans to other
animals not only permits a more complex regard for animality but also for human morality:
"the inadaquacies of [Hobbes's] system can be largely eliminated even in a philosophy which
stresses the similarities of various species, namely, in Hume's moral philosophy....Hume's use
of any and all given feelings as data, with the flexible range of imaginative association
operating on them, allows the admission of much wider data and more inclusive treatment
of them and, therefore, a much more adequate account of the variety and range of human
character and feeling"; The Understanding of Nature: Essays in the Philosophy of Biology,
Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science XXIII (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1974), 248-9.
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be such a one as with us would pass for incestuous, a parricide, an
assassin, an ungrateful, perjured traitor, and something else too
abominable to be named; not to mention his rusticity and illmanners" {Enquiries 329). Curiously enough, while in "A Dialogue"
Hume indicates that prohibitions against incest are not characteristic
of all human moral orders (and thence some moral societies are
societies which permit what others would call "incest"), elsewhere, in
a famous passage, Hume deploys the concept of incest in an effort to
exclude animals from most, if not all, of the moral realm {T 467-8).
While Hume may be right that incest cannot be intrinsically evil (a
claim obnoxious to both Cartesians and churchmen),if he is to be
consistent, the innocence of what we would call incest among animals
cannot be proof of the amorality of animals.'^
Hume maintains that standards of judgment are intrinsically bound
up with the specific set of conventions composing the ordinary life of
any given society. Hume also, however, posits a conceptually
necessary condition for any such judgments to qualify as moral
judgments. Hume writes in the Treatise that "Tis only when a
character is considered in general, without reference to our particular
" Stephen R, L. Clark effectively shows that Hume's argument here does not entirely
undermine the possibility of moral objectivity, for instance in the form of natural law. He
fails to consider, however, the way in which—in the typical fashion of a skeptic—Hume s
arguments are parasitic upon premises already asserted by others. See Clark's "Hume,
Animals, and the Objectivity of Morals" Philosophical Quarterly 35.139 (1983); 119-33.
" Interestingly enough, there seems to be some reason to think that Hume was empirically
wrong in holding that animals actually maintain no prohibitions (and cannot possibly
maintain prohibitions) against incest. In addition, chimpanzee, goose, and equine societies
have been found to observe strict rules of sexual interaction, rules so determinate as to make
possible instances of deception and infidelity among those who compose these groupings. See
Frans De Waal, Chimpanzee Politics (London: Johnathan Cape, 1982); J. Brown, Helping and
Communal Breeding in Birds: Ecology & Evolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1987); P. W. Sherman, "Nepotism and the Evolution of Alarm Calls," Science 197 (1977):
133-40; C. Packer, "Reciprocal Altruism in Papio Anuhis," Nature 265 (1977): 441-3; G. S.
Wilkinson, "Food Sharing in Vampire Bats," Scientific American 262 (1990): 76-82; Jane
Goodall, The Chimpanzees of Combe: Patterns of Behavior (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1986); J. Hoogland, "Prairie Dogs Avoid Extreme Inbreeding," Science 215 (1982):
1639-41; Carl Ericson, "Mate Selection," in D. MacFarlane, ed., Oxford Companion to Animal
Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981); Maurice K. Temerlin, Lucy: Growing Up
Human: A Chimpanzee Daughter in a Psychotherapist's Family (Palo Alto: Science and
Behavior Books, 1975); N. Bischoff, "Comparative Ethology of Incest Avoidance," in Robin
Fox, ed., Biosocial Anthropology (London; Malaby Press, 1975). In addition, for an insightful
philosophical account of human continuity with animals see Mary Midgley, The Ethical
Primate: Humans, Freedom arui Morality (London: Routledge, 1994).
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interest, that it causes such a feeling as denominates it morally good
or evil" {T472, emphasis mine). If the necessity of this condition can
be maintained as a requirement for considering a judgment to he a
moral judgment, then the question of whether or not animals can
enter into moral life hangs on determining whether or not animals
can abstract from their own particular (or at least partial) interests and
subsequently consider character "in general."'^ Knut Tranoy main
tains that on Humean grounds the limitations of animal reason and
understanding preclude animals from successfully achieving this
general view.^^ Similarly, Antony E. Pitson aigues that "our ability
take the common or general view appears to reflect just those respects
in which we differ crucially from animals.'"' My sense is that Hume
would agree with them.''® However, I am not inclined to agree, and
I suspect that Hume's as well as Tranoy's and Pitson's judgment
about animals capacity is itself misled by the data available to them.
In recent years, animal behaviorists have discovered layers of
" Hume's friend Adam Smith (1723-90) would soon afterwards develop this notion of
generality into his figure of the "impartial spectator"; Theory of the Moral Sentiments (1759).
Tranoy writes: "This [capacity] pre-supposes at least an ability to reason from probabilities,
to predict and foresee the consequences of alternative courses of action, in short and to use
a Humean phrase, to reason experimentally. It is only by this manner of reasoning that we
are able to feel the crucial and specific moral sentiment even though the character or artion
should go counter to our own private interests" (100).
" Antony E. Pitson, "The Nature of Humean Animals" Hume Studies 19.2 (1993): 303.
*' Tranoy himself writes: "I confess that I have found it so difficult on Hume's theory to
defend the moral difference between animals and men that I have also doubted that Hume
actually wanted to maintain this difference" (95n2). He subsequently, however, points to a
number of passages as evidence for Hume's holding that animals have no moral standing. In
the first, Tranoy points to Hume's refusal to grant moral standing to "irrational" but animate
objects (T 463); but Hume clearly maintains that many animals are rational—perhaps Hume
is referring to plants and animals such as worms. In the second case, Tranoy points to
Hume's refusal to grant "all the same virtues and vices" to animals that are attributed to
humans (T 467-68); but Hume does not disown the possibility that some of the same virtues
and vices might be held in common. Finally, although Tranoy does not make use of it, in
this same passage Hume writes of animals that "Their want of a sufficient degree of reason
may hinder them from perceiving the duties and obligations of morality" (T 468). Hume's
use of "may" renders this claim one about possibility not actuality. Perhaps most
importantly, however, one must remember that in these passages Hume is addressing
Cartesian thinkers who most certainly hold that animals have no place in morality. While
it is true, then, that in these passages he circles around the denial of animal morality, we must
understand that his granting the Cartesians this proposition in this context (a context where
his granting it to them makes it possible to criticize them on their own terms) does not
demonstrate that he finally holds to the proposition himself.
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complexity in animal society which may plausibly be explained as
adherence to general concepts and general rules, censure for the
violation of which may therefore be understood as judgment
concerning character in general/^ Whether or not animal theorists
are right in advancing such conclusions is beyond the scope of this
paper. In any case, however, it is important to recognize—as Hume
does—that any determination one may reach regarding the moral
capacities of animals must be empirically informed and must,
moreover, be of entirely the same order as our determinations
regarding the moral stature of our fellow human beings. No arbitrary
and supposedly a priori claims can settle the issue.

Animals and the
Extension of Justice
It is important to see that there are two separate and independent
questions to be addressed here: (1) the question of whether or not
animals themselves are or may become moral creatures and (2) the
question of whether and to what extent human treatment of animals
may be understood by humans in moral terms.In regard to the
domain of justice, Hume answers the second question resoundingly
in the negative, though by the terms of his own system I maintain
that his answer is ad hoc and baseless, if not downright false. Indeed,
In regard to the animals judging their fellows even when they have no individual selfinterest in the behavior they are censuring see: H. Kummer, "Aspects of Morality among
Non-fiuman Primates" in Gunther S. Stent, ed,. Morality as a Biological Phenomenon: Report
of the Dahlem Workshop on Biology and Morals, (Berlin: Abkon Verlagsgesellschaft, 1978);
Seyfarth & Cheney, "The Recognition of Social Alliances among Vervet Monkeys," Animal
Behavior 34 (1986); 1722-31; Seyfarth & Cheney, "Attending to Behavior versus Attending
to Knowledge: Examining Monkey's Attribution of Mental States, Animal Behavior 40
(1990): 742-53; and J. Cherfas, "Voices in the Wilderness," New Scientist 86 (1980), On other
aspects of animal morality see N. Tinbergen, "On War and Peace in Animals and Men,
Science 160 (1968); Konrad Lorenz, On Agression, trans. Marjorie Kerr Wilson (London:
Bantam, 1966); Vicki Hearne, Adam's Task: Calling Animals by Name (New York: Knopf,
1986); "Tracking Dogs, Sensitive Horses, and the Traces of Speech," Raritan 5.4 (1986): 1-35;
"Talking with Dogs, Chimps, and Others," Raritan 2.1 (1982): 71-91.
42^ Tranoy maintains, for example, that for Hume animals themselves are amoral; he does not
argue for the additional and independent proposition that humans have no moral obligations
to animals.
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the reasoning Hume presents to justify this exclusion implies a
number of undesirable consequences, consequences inconsistent with
some of his own claims. Hume writes in the Enquiries:
Were there a species of creatures intermingled with men,
which, though rational, were possessed of such inferior
strength, both of body and mind, that they were incapable of
all resistance, and could never, upon the highest provocation,
make us feel the effects of their resentment; the necessary
consequence, I think, is that we should be bound by the laws
of humanity to give gentle usage to these creatures, but should
not, properly speaking, lie under any restraint of justice with
regard to them, nor could they possess any right or property,
exclusive of such arbitrary lords. Our intercourse with them
could not be called society, which supposes a degree of
equality; but absolute command on the one side, and servile
obedience on the other. Whatever we covet, they must
instantly resign; Our permission is the only tenure, by which
they hold their possessions: Our compassion and kindness the
only check, by which they curb our lawless will....This is
plainly the situation of men, with regard to animals. {EPM 152
[190-1])
The body, then, no less than the mind, reasserts itself here in the
Enquiries in its capacity or incapacity to offer resistance. Inclusion
within society and entitlement to at least justice, property, and right
imply for Hume the capacity to resist, to thwart others' desires, and
to inflict injury upon one's peers. This is an important passage, and
analysis of it will disclose some of the central strengths and
weaknesses of Hume's position. To begin with, let us examine a
number of criticisms one may bring against Hume's use of this rather
Hobbist principle to exclude animals from important regions of moral
life.
First, Hume is wrong, or at least parochial, in assessing the
capacities of animals to offer physical resistance to human practices
and therefore to meet the necessary condition for inclusion within
society he stipulates here. Can it be true that a bear or even a
marmot can offer less resistance than a child or an habituated and
broken slave? How many of us think ourselves powerful enough to
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risk the effects of a grizzly who has been subjected to the "highest
provocation" we can muster?'*' Certainly it is possible for humans to
band together or to deploy various technologies in order to subdue
other animals, but these same measures can be successfully enlisted
against other humans. Since it is wrong in many cases to subdue
humans with such devices, the potential for subjection cannot, be
grounds for moral exclusion. Even in cases, therefore, where they
may be subjected to human will, if animals may correctly be
understood to possess capacities for resistance analogous to those of
humans (and it seems right to understand animals in this way), then
on Humean grounds animals qualify for inclusion within society and
for considerations of justice and right.
Perhaps, it may be suggested, animals' limited capacity to organize
resistance collectively among themselves marks a decisive disanalogy
between them and humans, and therefore provides grounds for
exclusion. I am not inclined to accept this line of counter-argument,
for it is hard to see why the disanalogy is relevant in any nonarbitrary way. Moreover, and more interestingly, it may be possible
to comprehend many of the inconveniences produced through certain
human relationships with other animals as collective, if not organized,
resistance to human practices. May we not count, for example, as
grounds for "reflection on future consequences" that would check our
passions {EPM 153 [191]) the accumulating effect upon human well
being that our treatment of animals collectively has produced? Hume
imagines that "no inconvenience ever results from the exercise" of our
power over animals and that, therefore, concepts of justice and
property must remain "useless" in our dealings with them {EPM 152
[191]). But surely he is wrong in this. The pernicious effects of a
carnivorous diet, of environmental pollution, of habitat decimation,
of the loss of species diversity, and of animal-based agribusiness upon
« Perhaps not surprisingly, Rousseau imagines a rather different outcome from a belligerent
encounter between a (purported type of) human and a bear, an account which does not
support Hume's contention that other animals are without the capacity to inflict injury upon
us; "Pit a bear or a wolf against a savage who is robust, agile, and courageous, as they all are,
armed with stones and a hefty cudgel, and you will see that the danger will be at least equal
on both sides" (Discourse on the Origins of Inequality [Indianapolis; Hackett, ], 20). If this be
the case in Rousseau's regard for "savage" humans, humans living in "advanced" society must
fare much worse.
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human health and happiness are by now well known, if contentious,
and at least apparently ominous.
Secondly, Hume suggests that, because of native-American peoples'
limited capacity to offer resistance, Europeans were mistakenly
tempted to regard "barbarous Indians" as lacking in sufhcient mental
capacity to warrant the protections of justice and the rest of moral
society. If the capacity to establish invulnerable dominion were
sufficient to undermine completely the claims of sympathy, then
more powerful nations would face no obligations of justice or right
to those weaker than they.'*'' In the case of "native" Americans,
Hume clearly does not hold such a position. If, however, such was
not the case with native Americans, why should it be the case with
animals? In addition, Hume writes that while under certain regimes
of passion, women were "reduced to slavery" because of the poor
regard people had for their mental powers and because of their
inferior "bodily force," with the reconstitution of human convention,
women came, he thought, to "share with the other sex in all the
rights and privileges of society" (EPM 152 [191]). Just as the
conventions of human society were realigned in order to increase the
extent to which women and native Americans are included, the terms
of Hume's own philosophical system imply that they can also be
realigned in order to include animals.''^ This must especially be the
case, since Hume's arguments and assertions regarding the continuity
of humans with other animals has already established "a degree of
equality" between our species and others.
A third strategy for undermining Hume's argument for excluding
animals from justice may be advanced through an appeal to Hume's
own theory of sympathy. Hume maintains that animals can
"never...make us feel the effects of their resentment." However,
because the human capacity for sympathy is variable, it is at least
possible that this claim may, under certain social conditions, be
decidedly false. Indeed, empirically speaking, this seems to be the
case. Humean philosophy renders it possible for the conventions
^ On this point I am in general sympathy with John King-Farlow, "Justice in Abundance and
Despair,** Philosophical Papers 6 (1977): 6. In addition, it is interesting to note that Hume's
claim about considerations of justice, etc., hanging upon the capacity for resistance implies
that God owes no considerations of justice or right to humanity.
Again, compare King-Farlow (^; and see his "Man, Beast and Philosophical Psychology,"
British Journal of Philosophy of Science 16 (1965): 85-101.
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structuring human society with animals to realize the capacities of
human sympathy in such ways as to make us subject to the rather
unpleasant experience of feeling not only animals' resentment but also
their suffering, their grief, and their loss, all without animals having
to lift a paw in retribution. Under social orders where conventions
structuring sympathy in this manner are absent, animals would, of
course, remain excluded from considerations of justice; but as Hume
has it, the human capacity for sympathetic fellow-feeling must be
fluid, and we have solid grounds for believing that the range of
modulation of that capacity makes it possible, if not imperative, to
share sympathetically in the harm inflicted upon other animals.
Besides undermining the argument Hume presents, we may also
advance the case for understanding our relations with other animals
in terms of justice and injustice by remarking upon Hume's
articulation of the very conditions which make justice a legitimate
concept in the first place. Hume describes two fundamental
conditions that lead us to considerations of this virtue: (1) limited
resources and (2) expansive human desires whose satisfactions cannot
all be accomplished within those limits (fPAT §111, Part I; T Book III,
Part II). In order to overcome the inconveniences resulting from
these conditions, the artifice of justice was invented together with its
attendant institutions, private property and legal right. Justice,
therefore, rests for Hume not upon metaphysical claims about natural
or revealed law or upon the existence of intrinsic natural rights.
Rather, Hume is clear that "public utility is the sole origin of justice,
and...the reflections on the beneficial consequences of this virtue are
the sole foundation of its merit" {EPM 145 [183)).
We have seen that, for Hume, we share with animals a common
(though by no means identical) life of thought and feeling. We have
also seen, in animals' capacity to offer resistance to human activity
and in our own capacity to feel the effects of harm inflicted upon
them, that non-human animals meet two of the necessary conditions
Hume stipulates for warranting considerations of justice. The question
now facing us is whether or not animals share with us the common
predicament of desire that exceeds the limited resources available to
us. It seems clear that they do. While it may have been much less the
case in Hume's time, the pressures of rapidly expanding populations
and economies have made it increasingly clear that the desires of
many animals to make use of the resources at hand are liable to be
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inconsistent with those of humans. This being the case, we have an
additional Humean reason for holding that reconstructing the artifices
of justice so as to include animals may well be an effective means of
producing and sustaining a more commodious human society. Given
the limited capacity of animals to participate in important institutions
related to justice (such as property and commerce) and given the
limited, though not insignificant, capacities of humans to develop
conventions that extend our sympathies to animals, this restructuring
may be itself rather limited.''^ We cannot, however, on Humean
grounds, maintain that it is impossible.
I have argued that Hume's philosophical thought not only admits
the possibility of incorporating animals into the moral institutions of
justice; it also implies the desirability and propriety of doing so. Even
if I am wrong in this, it is important to see, however, that the
exclusion of animals from the realm of right and justice does not, for
Hume, entail excluding animals from the moral realm altogether.''^
Hume is clear that, although animals may not achieve "society" and
although they may not merit considerations of justice or right, "laws
of humanity" still bind us in our behavior towards them.''^ This is no
small claim for Hume to make, for in underwriting vast regions of
our moral life, the notion of "humanity" is of profound importance.
Even if institutions of justice be ignored, therefore, Humean
philosophy implies the possibility of establishing significant and
complex sets of moral conventions to govern our practices with and
among other animals.
" Thai the institution of property may be of limited use in considerations of justice toward
animals may indicate that the institution is not as basic as many interpreters of Hume have
imagined. Property, for Hume, is a useful institution for grounding the stability, security, and
liberty desirable in human society. Considerations of justice toward animals may, for
example, require balancing the goods of that institution against the related goods secured by
preserving sufficiently large and expansive habitats to ensure the long-term flourishing of
certain species, if not individual animals. I thank Professors Tatsuya Sakamoto (Keio
University) and Kiyoshi Shimokawa (Chubu University) for bringing these implications to
my attention.
" In this my position is consistent with that of Mary Midgley, Animals and Why They Matter
(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1983): "For Hume, exclusion from justice is by no
means exclusion from morality" (48). It is contrary to that advanced by Pitson: "Hume would
resist classifying animals as moral agents" ("The Nature of Humean Animals," 305).
•" Interestingly, John Rawls is in agreement with Hume in this: A Theory of Justice
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 505, 512.
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Indeed, Hume presents us with plausible reasons for maintaining
that the crucial moral sentiment he delineates under the rubric of
"humanity" may be enlarged so as to become not only a "feeling for
the happiness of mankind, and a resentment of their misery" {EPM
235 [286]; Appendix I, "Concerning Moral Sentiment"; T 579, 478,
586, 588-90) but also a feeling for the happiness of (at least some
portion of) non-human animalkind, and a resentment of their misery.
Hume writes that we possess a "warm concern for the interests of our
species" and that this concern is "attended with a delicate feeling of
all moral distinctions" {EPM 183 [225]). Not only does the
enlargement of this sentiment seem to be empirically verifiable,
Humean philosophy suggests it to be theoretically possible.
Moreover, there is no a priori reason to think that the moral
sentiment, which Hume maintains "nature has made universal in the
whole [human] species," may not extend beyond our species to others
{EPM 137 [173]).'" This is not to say that animals can, on Humean
grounds, attain to perfect peerage with humans; again, limitations of
passion, reason, sympathy, and bodily power will almost certainly
persist in important ways. Still, the demarcation of those limits can
only be achieved through experience, experiment, and, indeed, human
choice. It is, for Humeans, the project of civilization to explore, to
test, and to extend those limits.
Hume's theory of animality, then, offers us a powerful means of
understanding the relationship of humans to other animals. Among
the theory's virtues is its ability to chart a course for our thought and
action which both acknowledges the profound continuities between
humanity and animality and nevertheless maintains that significant
and probably insurmountable differences persist. Hume shows us that
we may regard animals as sharing with us a common life of reason
and passion, that we may convene social relationships with animals
that include them to a significant extent in our moral life, even in our
deliberations on justice. At the same time, Hume makes it clear both
that the extent of those relationships is likely to be quite limited and
Although I differ in my assessment of Trandy, in this I am in agreement with Denis G.
Arnold, "Hume on the Moral Difference between Humans and other Animals," History of
Philosophy Quarterly 12.3 (1995): 309-13. My view is also in accord with that advanced by
Annette C. Baier, "Knowing Our Place in the Animal World," in her Postures of the Mind
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985); see also Baier's A Progress of Sentiment
(Cambridgjs: Harvard University Press, 1991), 79.

120

1630-m0

that the fact of its being so is meet and proper. Hume's theory of
animality, therefore, avoids the absurdities of both Cartesians (who
hold that animals are soulless automata) and of some animal rights
theorists (at least those who deny human privilege). Hume himself
seems at times unaware of these implications. To articulate his
theory's implications and to correct its errors and inconsistencies,
however, only serves to magnify the power of his thought.

